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ABSTRACT 
There has been a recent increase in emphasis by the Federal Government on 
using alternative dispute resolution methods to resolve contract disputes. These 
methods are normally less expensive, faster, less intimidating and more responsive 
to the underlying problems of the dispute. 
Alternative dispute resolution is not effective for all disputes. Situations in 
which alternative dispute resolutions would be effective are identified. 
Additionally, the characteristics and advantages of alternative dispute resolution are 
discussed. The current legislation concerning the Government's usage of 
alternative dispute resolution is the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1990. 
The specific components of the Act are reviewed. The conventional dispute 
resolution process, and its disadvantages, are presented for comparison purposes. 
In September 1993, the United States Navy and Lockheed Corporation 
successfully used negotiations to settle a dispute concerning the termination of the 
Long Range Anti-submarine Warfare Capability Aircraft program. A case analysis 
was conducted on the issues of the dispute, the reasons a negotiated settlement was 
used and of the actual negotiation process and results. 
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A. BACKQROUD 
Despite all efforts to ensure Federal Government contracts 
clearly define the responsibilities of all parties involved, 
the possibility that the parties will disagree on an aspect or 
requirement of the contract still exists. Formal litigation 
has been the most conmon method of resolving contract disputes 
between the Federal Government and their contractors. However, 
formal litigation is not always the most efficient or 
effective method available for resolving contract disputes. 
There has been a recent increase in emphasis by the Federal 
Government on using alternative dispute resolution methods to 
resolve contract disputes. [Ref. 1] 
Although using an alternative dispute resolution method is 
not suitable for all contract disputes, these methods are 
normally less e:~pensive, faster, less intimidating, more 
sensitive to disputants' concerns and more responsive to 
underlying problems. They usually dispense better solutions, 
result in less alienation, produce a feeling that a dispute 
was actually heard and fulfill a need by the disputants to 
retain control by not handing the dispute over to lawyers, 
judges and the intricacies of the legal system.[Ref. 2] 
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There are a myriad of different alternative dispute 
resolution methods available to the Federal Government; but, 
there is no one best way that can solve all disputes. The 
nature of the dispute and of the parties involved will 
determine which method of dispute settlement will be the most 
appropriate. It is essential for contracting officers to be 
familiar with the advantages and disadvantages of the 
different alternative dispute resolution methods in order to 
ascertain which, if any, can be used in place of formal 
litigation to settle contract disputes. 
A case study of an actual dispute that was resolved using 
a negotiated settlement identifies specific issues that have 
to be addressed before making the decision to use an 
alternative dispute resolution method. It provides insight on 
both parties' viewpoints on why the alternative dispute 
resolution method was the most advantageous means available to 
settle the contract dispute. 
B. OBJBCTIVBS 
The primary objectives of this thesis are: 
1. To provide background on alternative dispute 
resolution fi~thods and to ascertain the current 
climate that exists in the government for using 
alternative dispute resolution to settle 
contract disputes. 
2. To weigh the benefits and limitations of alternative 
dispute resolution methods against the use of 
traditional formal litigation to settle contract 
disputes. 
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3. To identify and discuss the different types of 
alternative dispute resolution methods and to 
address advantages and disadvantages of each. 
4. To measure the effectiveness of alternative dispute 
resolution by conducting a case analysis of an actual 
contract dispute that was settled using an alternative 
dispute method. 
C. RBSBARCB QOBSTIORS 
1. Primary Research Question 
Why was a negotiated settlement used to solve the P-7A 
program dispute and what were the characteristics and 
results of the process? 
2. Subsidiary Research Questions 
a. What did both parties perceive to be the positive and 
negative aspects of using an alternative dispute 
resolution? 
b. Given the positive and negative aspects of the 
alternative dispute resolution, will alternative 
dispute resolution methods be the preferred option to 
resolve future contract disputes. 
c. What is the Federal Government's current policy 
concerning the use of alternative dispute resolution 
to settle contract disputes with their contractors. 
d. What are the most common types of alternative dispute 
resolution available to the Federal Government for 
solving contract disputes? 
D. SCOPB 
This thesis focuses on the most common alternative dispute 
resolution methods and their applicability for usage by the 
Federal Government. A literary search was conducted to develop 
background information on alternative dispute resolution 
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methods and to identify characteristics of specific 
alternative dispute resolution methods. The research 
identified the criteria necessary and the preferred 
environment that should exist prior to choosing an alternative 
dispute resolution method. 
The thesis includes a case analysis of an actual contract 
dispute that was resolved using an alternative dispute 
resolution method. The case analysis outlines the 
characteristics of an actual alternative dispute resolution 
and provides insight to the parties' pe..:spective on the use of 
alternative dispute resolution. 
There is no attempt to develop empirical data within the 
scope of this thesis. Only existing data and information was 
used within the scope of this thesis. 
B. LDIITATIOHS 
There is a minimum of empirical data available to support 
opinions and information derived in the thesis. All 
information on alternative dispute resolution is based on 
expert opinions and not on factual information. 
The information concerning the alternative dispute 
resolution case study is litigation sensitive. Therefore, to 
best protect the sensitivity of the case, no information could 
be sent to the researcher. The researcher had to travel to the 
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location of the material and was not able to keep any 
documentation concerning the case. This made the process of 
verifying facts difficult as the writing of the thesis 
continued. 
P. ASStDIFl'IOHS 
This thesis was written under the following assumptions: 
1. The reader has same knowledge of Federal Government 
contracting regulations concerning contract settlement 
procedures. 
2. The reader has legal assistance available to clarify 
and enhance information provided. 
G. LI'l'BRATORB RBVIBif UD JIBTIIODOLOGY 
The literature review was conducted from sources in both 
the public and private sectors which specialize in alternative 
dispute resolution. Their areas of concern ranged from user, 
research and policy implementation. 
Types of literature which were reviewed included: 
1. Books on types and processes of the different 
alternative dispute resolution methods. 
2. Magazine articles which stated opinions of and issues 
concerning alternative dispute resolution methods. 
3. Policy papers conducted by Federal Government agencies 
stating policy and procedures of using alternative 
dispute resolution. 
4. House of Representative hearings and acts concerning 
alternative dispute resolution. 
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5. Interviews with personnel involved with the alternative 
dispute resolution case analysis. 
The literature review was conducted to supply the 
researcher with sufficient information on all aspects of 
alternative dispute resolution methods. In doing so, the 
Government's policy and views concerning the use of 
alternative dispute resolution to solve contract disputes was 
established. 
The case analysis of a contract dispute which was settled 
using a alternative dispute resolution method involved 
research of the documentation concerning the dispute. 
Interviews of the personnel involved with the case were 
conducted to support the documentation and to ascertain the 
parties' positions that existed during the dispute resolution. 
H. ORGARIZATIOll 01' STUDY 
This thesis is arranged into five chapters. Chapter I 
provides a brief background of alternative dispute resolution 
methods and states the objectives and research questions of 
the thesis. It delineates the scope, limitations and 
assumptions of the thesis and outlines the methodology used to 
conduct the necessary research. 
Chapter II defines alternative dispute resolution, 
discusses related legislature and outlines the suitability and 
advantages of using alternative dispute resolution to settle 
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contract disputes. Chapter II discusses inefficiencies and 
disadvantages that exist in using formal litigation. Chapter 
II describes the environment that exists today concerning the 
usage of alternative dispute resolution. 
Chapter III defines and discusses the most common types of 
alternative dispute resolution methods and gives the 
advantages and disadvantages of each type. 
Chapter IV presents the data obtained from the case 
analysis and analyzes the alternative dispute resolution 
process and present each parties's position and views of that 
process. 
Chapter V summarizes the findings, analyzes the data 
addressed in previous chapters and makes conclusions and 
recommendations based on that data. This chapter answers the 




II. BACKGROUIID OR AL~'l'IVB DISPU'l'l: USOLU'!'IC. 
A. DrrJt.ODUC'l'IOR 
Current interests in alternative dispute resolution are 
not a new phenomenon[Ref. 3]. In 1850, Abraham Lincoln 
succinctly put it: 
Discourage litigation. Persuade your neighbors to 
compromise whenever you can. Point out to them how the 
nominal winner is often a real loser - in fees, expenses 
and waste of time. As a peacemaker, the lawyer has a 
superior opportunity of being a good man. There will be 
business enough. [Ref. 4] 
That outlook still exists today. The use of alternative 
dispute resolution will play a role in President Clinton's 
initiative to streamline Government. During his presidential 
campaign he stated: 
In my view, the best reforms are those that make it less 
likely for people to go to court. We should encourage 
greater use of alternative dispute resolution to give 
consumers redress without having to litigate, such as 
mediation, mini-trial and the multi-door 
courthouse. [Ref. 5] 
The need for simplified dispute resolution processes is 
underscored by the growth in Federal regulations and related 
litigation [Ref. 6] . The number of lawsuits filed in 
the United States is enormous. According to the Administrative 
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Office of the U.S. Courts, the total number of civil cases 
commenced in the United States totaled over 220,000 in 1989. 
The Federal Government was party in over 55,000 of these 
cases. [Ref. 7] The Administrative Conference of the 
United States is an independent agency whose purpose is to 
promote improvement in the efficiency, adequacy and fairness 
of procedures by which Federal agencies conduct regulatory 
programs, administer grants and benefits, and perfo~ related 
Governmental functions[Ref. 8]. The Administrative 
Conference's studies on the use of alternative dispute 
resolution have determined that their appropriate use 
throughout the Federal Government will: 
1. Enhance the responsiveness of agencies. 
2. Increase the acceptability of their decisions. 
3. Help reduce the contentiousness, delay and expense often 
associated with agency decision making.[Ref. 9] 
To promote the use of alternative dispute resolution the 
Congress passed the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 
1990. This Act has helped pave the way for alternative dispute 
resolution becoming a preferred method of settling contract 
disputes in the Federal Government. 
B. DBPIRITIOR 
The te~ •alternative dispute resolution" as per the 
Administrative Dispute Resolution Act: 
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' 
means any procedure that is used, in lieu of an 
adjudication, as defined in section 551(7) of this title, 
to resolve issues in controversy, including but not limited 
to, settlement, negotiations, conciliation, facilitation, 
mediation, fact-finding, mini-trials, and arbitration, or 
any combination thereof.[Ref. 10] 
Section 551(7) further defines "adjudication" to 
include "agency process for the formulation of an order" and 
section 551 (6) defines an "order" as "the final disposition ... 
of an agency in a matter other than 
rulemaking"[Ref. 11]. Subsequently, alternative 
dispute resolution can broadly include any procedure an agency 
may use to resolve any issue in controversy in any federal 
activity. [Ref. 12] 
C. CCDIV1Dl'l'IOBAL DISPt:J"'B RBSOLU'l'IOH 
1. Background 
In 1978, Congress enacted the Contract Disputes Act to 
bring greater consistency, fairness and efficiency to the 
resolution of contract disputes with the Federal 
Government.[Ref. 13] The Act established specific 
procedures and time frames that applied to all complaints 
involving the Federal Government. The goal of the Contract 
Disputes Act was to provide an informal and expeditious 
process for resolving disputes without disrupting contract 
performance. [Ref. 14] 
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2. Proc••• 
The initial step of any complaint is for the 
contractor to submit the complaint in writing to the 
Government Contracting Officer for final decision. The 
Contracting Officer is the only point of entry for any 
complaint involving a Government contract. The Contracting 
Officer has to make a decision on that clatm before it can be 
presented to any other tribunal. The Contract Disputes Act 
also gives the Contracting Officer the authority to use an 
alternative dispute resolution technique to resolve the clatm 
amicably. The Contracting Officer's decision on the clatm is 
final, conclusive and not subject to review unless a timely 
appeal is submitted to a proper forum. Upon a final decision, 
the contractor can litigate the Contracting Officer's decision 
in either of two forums: the appropriate board of contract 
appeals or the U.S. Clatms Court. [Ref. 15] 
The Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA) is 
the oldest and largest board of appeals[Ref. 16]. The 
following are standard procedures that are followed by the 
ASBCA when processing a clatm against the Government after a 
final decision by the Contracting Officer: 
1. Appeals - The contractor must file with the ASBCA written 
notice of appeal within ninety days of receipt of the 
decision. 
11 
2. Appeal Pile - The Contracting Officer must file with the 
ASBCA all pertinent documents within thirty days of 
receipt of the appeal. 
3. Complaint - The contractor must file the complaint 
setting forth the basis for and the amount of the claim 
within thirty days of docketing the appeal of the ASBCA. 
The Government's reply is due within thirty days after 
receipt of the complaint. 
4. Written Discovery - The ASBCA rules provide that 
responses to interrogatories, requests for admission and 
requests for production of documents are due within 
forty-five days after service. 
5. Depositions - The deposition practice before the ASBCA 
has become nearly as extensive as in typical court 
litigation. 
6 . Subpoenas - The ASBCA has the power to issue subpoenas 
compelling testimony in deposition at trial. 
7. Hearings - are conducted before one of the members of 
ASBCA members and a written transcript is produced. 
8. Decisions - After the hearings, the parties customarily 
submit simultaneous post hearing briefs. The ASBCA then 
issues a decision in writing.[Ref. 17] 
The appeals process is often characterized as being 
complex and inefficient. Despite this, the number and 
frequency of disputes requiring resolution by boards of 
contract appeals has continued to increase. Reasons for this 
include: 
1. Historical reasons, such as the growing impact of 
Government contracting, increased complexity of 
contracts, new auditing and other regulatory requirements 
and an expanded notion of necessary due process rights. 
2. MOre contractors have developed a dependence on the 
Government for their existence. 
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3. There is a increased willingness to resort to litigation 
among contractors and an expanding Government contracts 
bar. 
4. There is an increasing public division or controversy 
over the wisdom of some kinds of defense expenditures, 
which often is vented peripherally in controversies over 
contract or administration decisions. 
5. Increased scrutiny by many congressional sources may 
discourage Contracting Officers or their supervisors from 
risking close calls or taking on politically sensitive 
cases. 
6. The establishment of intra-agency audit offices and 
statutes or rules enhancing their authority, has served 
to inhibit settlement of disputes and limit decisional 
flexibility.[Ref. 18] 
The combined result of the above factors has reduced 
a willingness or ability of Contracting Officers to assume 
during their decision-making responsibilities, and has 
increased doubt that the Contracting Officers truly act to 
serve the best interests of the Government. [Ref. 19] 
3. Diaadvantagea of CODventioaal Di-.pute ReaolutiOD 
The following negative factors exist in conventional 
resolution processes. These further support the idea that 
alternative dispute resolution methods should be utilized 
whenever possible. 
1. Cost, delay: 
(a) The process is expensive; costs often exceed 
benefits. 
(b) Litigation does not provide timely resolution of the 
dispute; delay imposes additional costs. 
13 
(c) The process consumes resources that could be applied 
to solve the problem. 
2. Access, participation: 
(a) Court proceedings and methods are difficult to 
understand. 
(b) Using courts requires employment of expensive 
intermediaries. 
(c) The differences in knowledge of the system and 
ability to bear costs, delay and uncertainty can 
create inequities between parties. 
3. Inappropriateness of forum: 
(a) Courts may lack expertise in the subject matter of 
the dispute. 
(b) Courts transfo~ disputes in ways that obscure the 
genuine issues between the parties. 
(c) Courts may be unable to give a remedy that addresses 
the underlying causes of the dispute. 
(d) The adversarial setting polarizes the parties and 
deflects them from the search for an optimal 
solution. 
4. Additional effects 
(a) The adversarial nature of the proceedings disrupt 
continuing relations between parties. 
(b) Court decisions may channel energy to preparation for 
further adversarial encounters rather than prevent! ve 
problem solving. [Ref. 20] 
A principle objective of the Contracting Officer in 
settling contract disputes is to avoid the above factors. He 
can achieve this by increasing his use of alternative dispute 
resolution. By recognizing the usefulness of alternative 
dispute resolution in his decision-making, by encouraging 
14 
. ~::. ......... ··'·· .. 
greater application of alternative dispute resolution and by 
improving the alternative dispute resolution skills of 
personnel who participate in the contracting process, 
Government contracting agencies can create a climate in which 
more disputes are rationally and justly settled without 
resorting to litigation. [Ref. 21] 
D. .IDIID'IS'l'RATIVB DISPUTB RBSOLU'l'IOB ACT OP 1990 
1. BacltgroUDd 
The Administrative Dispute Resolution Act establishes 
a statutory framework for federal agency use of alternative 
dispute resolution in accordance with reforms advocated by the 
Administrative Conference of the United States. States, courts 
and private entities have increasingly used alternative 
dispute resolution in the past decades. The Act seeks to prod 
federal agencies to use alternative dispute resolution methods 
to enable the parties to foster creative, acceptable solutions 
and to produce expeditious decisions requiring fewer resources 
than formal litigation. Prior to enactment of the 
Administrative Dispute Resolution Act, the Administrative 
Conference had repeatedly encouraged federal agency use of 
alternative dispute resolution processes, but progress had 
been slow. The legislation seeks to broaden agency authority, 
resolve legal questions and prompt agencies to use more 
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consensual processes to enhance the possibility of reaching 
agreements expeditiously, within the confines of agency 
authority. Congress' findings have concluded that alternative 
dispute resolution can lead to more creative, efficient, 
stable and sensible solutions. [Ref. 22] 
2. Promotion of the Act 
"Findings", Section 2 of the Administrative Dispute 
Resolution Act concludes that the public will benefit from the 
efficiencies, cost savings and less contentious decision-
making that alternative dispute resolution will produce. To 
achieve these benefits, section 3 of the Administrative 
Dispute Resolution Act outlines actions the agencies must take 
to promote the use of alternative dispute resolution. 
a. .Promulgation of Agency Po~icy 
Each agency must adopt a policy that addresses the 
use of alternative dispute resolution. In developing the 
policy each agency will: 
1. Consult with the Administrative Conference of the United 
States and the Federal Mediation and Conciliation 
Service. 
2. Examine means of resolving disputes in connection with: 
(a) formal and informal adjudication 
{b) rulemaking 
{c) enforcement action 
(d) issuing and revoking licenses or permits 
{e) contract administration 
(f) litigation brought by or against the agency 
{g) other agency actions. [Ref. 23] 
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Developing the policy should be a dynamic process and 
should used as a management tool in order to: 
1. Declare official agency supp~rt, at the highest levels, 
for using alternative dispute resolution to improve the 
operation of the agency programs. 
2. Identify sources of delay and inefficiency in existing 
procedures. 
3. Establish goals and a timetable for reducing delay and 
inefficiency. 
4. Educate agency personnel about the availability and uses 
of alternative dispute resolution. 
s. Foster an interest among agency personnel in using 
informal consensual methods to resolve 
disputes. [Ref. 24] 
b. Dispute Resolutlou Specialists 
The head of each agency will designate a senior 
official to be the dispute resolution specialist of the 
agency. The official will be responsible for the 
implementation of the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act 
and the corresponding policy developed by the 
agency. [Ref. 25] 
c. Trai.zJ1Dg 
Bach agency will provide training on a regular 
basis for the dispute resolution specialist of the agency and 
other employees involved in implementing the policy of the 
agency. The training should include the theory and practice of 
negotiation, mediation, arbitration and related techniques. 
The dispute resolution specialist will periodically recommend 
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to the agency employees who would benefit from similar 
training. [Ref. 26] 
d. Procedures for Grants aDd Cont:ract:s 
Each agency will review each of its standard 
agreements for contracts, grants and other assistance and 
determine whether to amend any such agreements to authorize 
and encourage the use of alternative dispute resolution 
methods. 
Within one year after the enactment of the 
Administrative Dispute Resolution Act, the Federal Acquisition 
Regulations will be amended as necessary to carry out the 
Act. [Ref. 27] 
3 • Eey Provisions of the Act 
a. Aut:bor1 ty t:o Use Neutrals 
Agencies can employ the use of mutually acceptable 
neutrals to serve as a conciliator, facilitator or mediator. 
The neutral cannot have an official, financial or personal 
conflict of interest with respect to the issue in controversy 
unless this interest is fully disclosed in writing to all 
parties and then the parties agree to the 
neutral. [Ref. 28] 
The Administrative Conference of the United States 
will establish standards for neutrals and maintain a roster of 
individuals who meet those standards. These individuals will 
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be made available upon request and will be compensated by the 
parties in dispute. [Ref. 29] 
b. Confiderltial.i ty 
The Administrative Dispute Resolution Act 
establishes rules to protect the confidentiality of the 
alternative dispute resolution proceedings. These protections 
are to enable the parties to be forthcoming and honest 
without the fear of their statements being used against them. 
Documents produced during an alternative dispute resolution 
are immune to discovery unless certain specific conditions 
exist. [Ref. 30] 
c. Use of Arbitration 
The Administrative Dispute Resolution Act 
authorizes the use of arbitration whenever the parties consent 
in writing. To ensure the arbitration is truly voluntary, the 
Federal Government is prohibited from requiring ~y party to 
consent to arbitration as a condition of receiving a contract 
or benefit. The Administrative Dispute Resolution Act 
specifies that a head of an agency is authorized to ter.minate 
an arbitration hearing at any time prior to the award becoming 
fiaal. An award becomes final 30 days after it is served on 
the parties. After the award becomes final it is binding and 
enforceable on the Government.[Ref. 31] 
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d. Amendments to tbe Contract Disputes Act of 1978 
The Contract Disputes Act is amended to make clear 
that Government contracting officers and boards of contract 
appeals are encouraged to resolve claims by use of alternative 
dispute resolution methods and have the authority to do 
so. [Ref. 32] 
4. Advantages of Alternative Dispute Resolution 
There are a number of distinct advantages that 
alternative dispute resolution methods have over adjudication. 
These advantages can translate into better, quicker and less 
expensive solutions to contract disputes. The advantages 
include: 
1. Faster process - This results in Government and 
contractor resources not being tied up while a decision 
is pending. Depending on the type of dispute, by using an 
alternative dispute resolution method, a decision could 
be made within months compared to a court decision which 
might take years. 
2. Cost savings - If you settle a dispute process quicker, 
it will result in lower attorney and related legal fees 
and will keep production moving. 
3. Flexibility - The parties can structure the process to 
meet their specific needs. They determine details such as 
rules and procedures, who will be involved, time and 
location and the length of discovery. 
4. Managerial control - Alternative dispute resolution 
methods allow managers to maintain control over the 
process. Since their company's time and resources are 
being spent, they will attempt to come to a quick 
decision in order to save time and resources. 
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5. Non-adversarial - Unlike adjudication, alternative 
dispute resolution focus on cooperation instead of being 
adversarial. This usually produces a win-win situation 
and can help prevent tension between the paries in future 
relations. 
6. Confidentiality - This allows the parties to openly 
discuss and solve their disputes without being subject to 
public scrutiny. 
B. USB 01' ALTBDJATIVB DISPUTB USOLUTIOB 
Analyzing where alternative dispute resolution can be used 
effectively is one of the most important concerns an agency 
has in developing an effective alternative dispute resolution 
program. It requires understanding the various types of 
alternative dispute resolution methods and which of the 
methods might be useful in particular types of disputes. The 
following is a list of situations where using an alternative 
dispute resolution method to settle a contract dispute would 
be effective: 
1. Creative solutions, not necessarily available in formal 
adjudication, may provide the most satisfactory outcomes. 
2. The cases do not involve or require the setting of 
precedent. 
3. All the substantially affected parties are generally 
involved in the proceeding. 
4. Variation in outcome is not a major concern. 
s. Maintaining confidentiality is not a concern or would be 
advantageous. 
6. Parties are likely to agree to use alternative dispute 
resolution. 
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7. Litigation in the particular context is generally a 
lengthy and/or expensive process. 
e. Cases of this frequently settle at some point in the 
process. 
9. The potential for impasse is high, because of poor 
communication among parties, conflicts within parties or 
technical complexity or uncertainty.[Ref. 33] 
Conversely, there are distinct situations in which an 
agency should consider not using an alternative dispute 
resolution method to settle a dispute. These situations are 
specifically addressed in the Administrative Dispute 
Resolution Act. An agency will consider not using a 
alternative dispute resolution proceeding if: 
1. A definitive or authoritative resolution of the matter is 
required for precedential value and such a proceeding is 
not likely to be accepted generally as an authoritative 
precedent. 
2. The matter involves or may bear upon significant 
questions of Government policy that require additional 
procedures before a final resolution may be made and such 
a proceeding would not likely serve to develop a 
recommended policy for the agency. 
3. Maintaining established policies is of special 
importance, so that variations among individual decisions 
are not increased and such a proceeding would not likely 
reach consistent results among individual decisions. 
4. The matter significantly affects persons or organizations 
who are not parties to the proceeding. 
5. A full public record of the proceeding is important and 
a dispute resolution proceeding cannot provide such a 
record. 
6. The agency must maintain continuing jurisdiction over the 
matter with authority to alter the disposition of the 
matter in the light of changed circumstances and a 
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dispute resolution proceeding would interfere with the 
agency's fulfilling that requirement. [Ref. 34] 
P. RBSUL'l'S OP AL'l'DIIA'l'IVB DISPU'l'B RBSOLU'l'ICDT USA.CD 
Alternative dispute resolution methods have been used by 
several agencies in enforcement cases and other regulatory 
proceedings, as well as for resolving contract disputes, 
personnel and equal opportunity disputes and environmental 
cases. Results of their use has been impressive. The 
Department of Labor ran a pilot program in one of its regional 
offices using mediation to resolve enforcement cases involving 
the workplace, including cases involving the Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration, and wage and hour 
regulations. The Department's evaluation of the program 
documented that both agency and industry parties were quite 
satisfied with the use of alternative dispute resolution and 
that in many cases the results of the mediation were quicker 
and better than litigation. The Department has recently 
decided to expand the program to all of their regions. The 
Farmers Home Administration found that it saved millions of 
dollars using mediation to avoid foreclosures in farmer-lender 
disputes. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation has saved 
millions of dollars in 1992 alone in litigation costs from 
its mediation program involving creditor claims arising from 
failed banks. And the Environmental Protection Agency has had 
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significant successes using regulated negotiations as well as 
with mediation to resolve Superfund hazardous waste cleanup 
proceedings. [Ref. 35) 
The Department of Defense should see similar positive 
savings as contracting activities structure alternative 
dispute resolution procedures, as required by the 
Administrative Dispute Resolution Act, into their cCXIIII&lld 
policies. 
G. su.ARY 
There has been an increased emphasis by the Federal 
Government concerning the usage of alternative dispute 
resolution to settle contract disputes with their contractors. 
Using conventional dispute resolution can result in several 
disadvantages to the disputants. When utilized correctly, 
alternative dispute resolution can offer a process in which 
these disadvantages would be nonexistent. However, alternative 
dispute resolution can only be used if contracting officers 
are familiar with the different processes and the situations 
where they are used most effectively. 
The U.S. Congress passed the Administrative Dispute 
Resolution Act of 1990 in order to promote the use of 
alternative dispute resolution by Federal contracting 
officers. As required by the Act, the implementation of an 
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alternative dispute resolution program and continued training 
on that program, should result in a substantial increase of 
alternative dispute resolution usage by Federal agencies. 
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III. ALTDITATin DISI"''m USOLU'riO. DtaODS 
A. Dl'l'ltODUC'l'IO. 
Alternative dispute resolution methods can range from the 
most rule bound and coercive to the most informal. Specific 
methods differ in various ways, such as: 
1. Whether participation is voluntary. 
2. Whether decisions are made by disputants or by a third 
party. 
3. Whether the procedures employed are formal or informal. 
4. Whether the decision is legally enforceable. 
[Ref. 36] 
Alternative dispute resolution methods are numerous and 
diverse, they range along a spectrum from consensual decision-
making techniques, such as mediation, to more definitive 
techniques, such as binding arbitration. Alternative dispute 
resolution methods tend to emphasize cooperation and 
creativity in choosing and using processes that can best 
settle the dispute and subsequently result in more acceptable 
and more efficiently made decisions. [Ref. 37] 
Among the most common and effective types of alternative 
dispute resolution methods are negotiation, mediation, 
arbitration, mini-trial and fact-finding. 
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In negotiations, the parties seek to resolve a 
disagreement or to plan a transaction through discussions with 
the assumption that the parties will divide a limited resource 
to the mutual satisfaction of both parties. 
Negotiation is the most cOIIIIlOn form of alternative dispute 
resolution and should be used by contracting officers as the 
first step in resolving disputes. The parties should attempt 
to work out their problems directly through collaborative or 
adversarial approaches between themselves before employing 
another method of dispute resolution [Ref. 38] • If 
another type of alternative dispute resolution is used, it is 
usually a variation of negotiation involving the use a neutral 
third-party to assist in the process. 
Although there is no set rules or procedures in 
negotiations, there are five basic points that should be 
followed to facilitate negotiations [Ref. )']: 
1. Separate the people from the problem - The negotiators 
should see themselves as attacking the problem posed by 
the negotiator, not each other. 
2. Focus on interests not positions - Your positions are 
what you want. Your interests are why you want them. 
Focusing on interests may uncover the existence of 
mutual or complementary interests that will make 
agreements possible. 
3. Invent options for mutual gain - Even if the parties' 
interests differ, there may be bargaining outcomes that 





4. Insist on objective criteria - There are some 
negotiations,·- or at least some issues that are not 
susceptible to a win-win situation. In order to minimize 
the risk of inefficient haggling or a failure to reach an 
agreement, the parties should first attempt to agree on 
objective criteria to govern the outcome. 
5. Know your Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA) - The reason you negotiate with someone is to 
produce bette~ results than you could obtain without 
negotiating. Know the results you would obtain with 
unsuccessful negotiations before accepting an agreement 
you would be better off rejecting. 
1. Advantage• 
Negotiations are usually voluntary, informal and 
unstructured. They facilitate an environment that will result 
in an agreement that is mutually acceptable to all concerned 
parties. Negotiations place a premium on control by the 
parties. This enables the process to remain flexible and open 
to the needs of the disputants. Negotiations usually are non-
adversarial in nature, this enhances the disputants' ability 
to maintain a good relationship during future endeavors. 
The negotiation process and results are of a private 
nature and are not subject to public scrutiny. Being so, 
negotiators are only concerned with how they perceive the 
results and not on how other interested, but uninvolved, 
parties might perceive the results. 
The predominant reason that negotiations are becoming 
more widely used is that the characteristics of the 
negotiation process generally lead to more timely and cost-
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effective settlements, as opposed to the other options 
available to settle the dispute. 
2. »l•adYalltasr•• 
Negotiations are usually not effective in adversarial 
environments. Por effective negotiations, both parties must be 
willing to negotiate with the goal of finding a mutually 
acceptable agreement. Results of the negotiations are 
enforceable only to the extent of a settlement agreement; 
subsequently, if the parties are unwilling to compromise their 
positions, they should not waste their time and resources by 
entering into negotiations. 
Negotiations are not always effective for Government 
contract disputes. Government personnel can lack equal 
negotiating skills and experience of government personnel of 
negotiators in the private sector, so it is imperative that 
the Government uses capable personnel to negotiate contract 
disputes in order to best protect the public's interest. 
Additionally, negotiations are not always suitable for 
disputes which might establish precedence or might be of 
public concern [Ref. 40] . Before deciding to use 
negotiations, a Contracting Officer must be aware of the 
interest the public might have on the outcome of the dispute. 
Por example, if there was an indication of fraud by a 
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contractor, the public would not be pleased if the matter was 
resolved used negotiations. 
C. KIIDIA'l'IOR 
Mediation is ordinarily an informal , non-binding process 
in which a neutral third-party assists the parties in reaching 
, 
a negotiated settlement of their differences. Mediation is 
most appropriate for disputes in which the parties have 
reached, or anticipate reaching, a negotiation impasse. 
Factors which contribute to a negotiation impasse include 
personality conflicts, poor communication, the existence of 
multiple parties, or inflexible negotiating postures 
[Ref. 41] . A mediator can assist the parties in 
breaking down barriers and coming to an agreement by helping 
them develop options, compromising and exploring acceptable 
settlements to the dispute. 
Mediation might prove most effective in situations where 
[Ref. 42] : 
1. MUltiple issues have to be resolved. 
2. There is no need to establish precedent and there is no 
single •right• solution that is required. 
3. Tensions, emotions, or transaction costs are running 
high. 
4. Communication between the parties has broken down. 
5. Time is a major factor. 
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6. Failure to agree does not clearly benefit one or more 
parties. 
7. Issues are complex and individual parties have an 
interest in maintaining confidentiality with respect to 
key issues. 
' 8. The parties want or need to maintain some ongoing 
relationship. 
The role of the mediator can be as active as the parties 
permit, thus keeping the parties in control of the process. To 
facilitate the communication and negotiation between the 
parties, the mediator can be expected to fulfill any of the 
following roles: 
1. Urging participants to agree to talk. 
2. Helping participants understand the mediation process. 
3. carrying messages between the parties. 
4. Helping participants agree on an agenda. 
5. Setting an agenda. 
6. Providing a suitable environment for negotiation. 
7. Maintaining order. 
8. Helping participants understand the problems. 
9. Defusing unrealistic expectations. 
10. Helping participants develop their own proposals. 
11. Helping participants negotiate. 
12. Persuading participants to accept a particular solution. 
[Ref. 43] 
The mediator must develop a strategy to accomplish the 
role he is tasked to fulfill. Bach situation is unique in its 
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characteristics, the following influences should be considered 
by the mediator in development of his strategy: 
1. The number and identity of the participants and their 
previous relationship. 
2. Whether participants will have relationship in the 
future. 
3. The subject matter. 
4. The degree of crisis. 
s. Whether third parties are affected. 
6. Whether society is affected. 
7. The risk of non-settlement. 
8. The alternatives to mediated agreement. 
[Ref. 44] : 
1. .Advantagea 
The advantages of mediation are similar to those of 
negotiation. Mediation is also flexible, voluntary, timely, 
cost-effective, private and structured to meet the needs of 
the specific situation. Mediation will break down barriers 
that previously existed and can establish an environment in 
which the parties effectively communicate and settle the 
dispute. As with negotiation, the integrity of the mediation 
is assured by the self-interest of each party. 
The mediator can C<.;.avey a different perspective on the 
issues involved and ensure the parties are moving in a 
positive direction towards settlement. If the parties are 
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unfamiliar with alternative dispute resolution methods, a 
successful mediation may provide the parties with a basis in 
which they can negotiate their own dispute settlements in the 
future. 
2. Disadvantages 
Since mediation is non-binding and voluntary, to be 
effective both parties must be willing to participate in good 
faith and be willing to accept the results of the process. If 
the parties are moving in a direction in which reaching a 
settlement will be unlikely, they should consider proceeding 
with another form of resolution. Accordingly, mediation would 
be ineffective when the extremity of hostility would make any 
form of discussions useless. 
It is not advisable to use mediation when one party's 
~osition is weaker than the other party's. Mediation works 
best when the parties have equal negotiation power, resources 
and information. This enables the mediator to remain impartial 
and not put in a position of having to act as an equalizer. 
D. ARBITRATIOH 
The essence of arbitration is that a neutral third party 
selected by the disputing parties decides the issues after 
receiving evidence and arguments from the parties. The neutral 
is selected primarily because of subject-matter expertise. 
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Arbitration may be binding on the parties by operation of law 
or through contractual agreement. Non-binding arbitration is 
also practiced to a limited extent. Arbitration may be either 
voluntary or mandatory, depending on the basis of the 
structure. Arbitration is commonly used to resolve disputes 
between Government prime contractors and their subcontractors 
and in the commercial sector, especially in settling labor-
management disputes. 
Since the early 1900s the Comptroller General has taken 
the view that, unless a federal agency had explicit statutory 
authorization, it was prohibited from using a private 
arbitrator to decide on any claim involving the Government. 
However, under the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 
1990, agencies can agree to binding arbitration, provided that 
the decision does not become final and binding on the agency 
for thirty days. During that period, the agency has a right to 
vacate the decision. [Ref. 45] Federal contract cases 
would be good candidates for arbitration when: 
1. The standard to be applied already has been established 
by statute, precedent or rule. 
2. The resolution of the dispute need not have precedential 
effect or establish major new policies. 
3. The parties want the arbitrator to base the decision on 
some general standard without regard to the prevailing 
norm. 
4. It would be valuable to have a decision-maker with 
technical, in addition to legal knowledge. 
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s. The parties desire privacy. [Ref. 46] 
Arbitration is typically initiated in by one of three 
methods: 
1. The parties agree before a conflict arises to submit all 
disputes to arbitration. 
2. The parties agree to submit to arbitration after the 
dispute arises. 
3. A court, agency or statute mandates that the dispute be 
arbitrated. [Ref. 47] 
The specific procedures for presenting the case depends on 
the arbitration agreement, but is usually informal with 
limited discovery and relaxed evidentiary rules 
[Ref. 48] . Arbitration is appropriate when two 
conditions exist: there is no reasonable likelihood of a 
negotiated settlement and there will not be a continuing 
relationship after the settlement. Subsequently, arbitration 
is effective in determining who is right and wrong in a 
dispute and is not used to facilitate negotiations. 
Arbitration can be used in conjunction with mediation. In 
that, if a complete settlement cannot be achieved during 
mediation, the mediator can perfor.m as arbitrator and decide 
on any issues not resolved. 
1. Advantages 
The relative speediness of the arbitration process is 
frequently cited as its major advantage. Studies of the 
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typical commercial arbitration found that the average time 
from submission of a dispute to a final decision is only sixty 
days. [Ref . 49] 
This expeditious process ideally saves the parties 
significant time and money. Since discovery in arbitration is 
often curtailed and the hearing itself can be simpler than a 
judicial hearing, which employs all the rules of evidence, an 
arbitration subsequently takes less time and money. 
[Ref. SO] 
By controlling the process, the parties can tailor the 
arbitration to best satisfy the unique requirements of the 
actual dispute. The ability of the parties to select the 
arbitrator is an distinct advantage. The parties can select an 
technical expert, which will eliminate the need to educate the 
arbitrator and will lead to a quick and well-informed 
decision. [Ref. 51] Additionally, the results of the 
arbitration can be kept private since the decision is not a 
public document, as it would be in a court proceeding. 
2. DiaadvaDtagea 
The efficiency of arbitration may be achieved at the 
expense of the quality of justice in individual decisions. In 
commercial and labor cases where there is a high volume of 
cases with fairly low stakes, trade-offs between an 
expeditious, inexpensive arbitration process and the assurance 
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of a more studied decision may be acceptable. But, in other 
types of disputes, parties may not agree to arbitration 
because they want the protection offered by the courts, or 
they want to maintain control over a settlement through a 
negotiation process. [Ref. 52] 
Because arbitrations are not always well documented 
and are less subject to public scrutiny, they lack the quality 
control of litigation. Arbitration awards may not accurately 
reflect the merits of the case when the arbitrator simply 
decides to •split the difference• between the parties. 
Additionally, the parties may be reluctant to arbitrate 
because the scope of review is limited and they may be bound 
by an unsatisfactory result. [Ref. 53] 
B. IIDTI ·ftDLS 
•Mini-trial• refer to specially designed processes, 
usually employed to resolve disputes that otherwise would be 
settled using litigation. The goal of mini-trials is to 
identify and discuss all available information and positions 
in order for the parties to reach a mutually satisfactory 
resolution. Mini-trials are tailored to the specific needa of 
the participants and may embody a number of different 
alternative dispute resolution processes. [Ref. 54] 
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Mini- trials are most appropriate in cases involving a 
small number of parties and are most useful in four types of 
disputes: 
1. Where the parties have reached or anticipate reaching a 
negotiation impasse due to one party's overestimation (in 
the view of the other party) of the strength of its 
position. 
2. Where significant policy issues exist which would benefit 
from a face-to-face presentation to decision-makers. 
3. Where the issues are technical and decision-makers and 
third-party neutral advisors have subject matter 
expertise. 
4. Where the imprimatur of a third-party neutral's expertise 
would aid in the resolution of the case. 
[Ref. 55] 
Although the specific procedures of a mini-trial will vary 
depending on the specific case and the parties' desires, most 
mini-trials will contain the following key elements: 
1. The parties voluntarily agree to use a mini-trial and 
they maintain the option to ter.minate the process at any 
time. 
2. The parties negotiate a procedural agreement that 
specifies obligations and responsibilities in the mini-
trial process. 
3. Prior to the mini-trial, the parties informally exchange 
key documents, exhibits, summaries of witnesses' 
testimony and introductory statements. 
4. The parties select a mutually acceptable neutral advisor 
to preside over the mini-trial. Unlike an arbitrator or judge, the neutral advisor has no authority to make a 
binding decision. The advisor's function will include 
asking questions to ascertain the strengths and 
weaknesses of each party and he may be asked to advise 
the parties on the likely outcome if the case went to 
trial. 
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5. The parties' lawyers make concise summary presentations. 
At a mini-trial rules of evidence do not apply; therefore 
if there is testimony by witnesses, it tends to be in 
narrative format under informal questioning. 
6. Mini-trial presentations are made to high-level 
representatives of the parties who have clear settlement 
authority. 
7. If the representatives are unable to negotiate a 
settlement immediately after the mini-trial, they may 
schedule further talks or presentations. 
llRd.dvU.tasr•• 
trials 
For most parties who choose to participate in mini-
the key considerations are time and money 
[Ref. 57]. Preparing and completing a mini-trial can 
take as short as a month as opposed to the two to four years 
required to complete a typical litigation. This results in 
substantial savings of personnel time, attorney fees, 
hearings, discove1.y burdens and opportunity costs. Because the 
majority of contract disputes involve questions of fact, it is 
more sensible for high level management to hear summary 
presentations and negotiate a settlement using good business 
judgement than it does for lawyers to litigate the facts for 
weeks or months[Ref. 58]. Although executives 
involved with mini-trials must devote some time studying the 
facts, circumstances and issues involved, they lose less time 
than they would have if the case had gone to trial 
[Ref. 59] • 
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The mini-trial format allows the parties flexibility, 
they can design the process to best suit the dispute at issue. 
Presentations can be shortened or expanded, the neutral 
advisor's role can be broadened or eliminated and negotiations 
can be carried out with or without the presence of the 
advisor. [Ref. 60] 
Mini-trials provide confidentiality to the parties; 
the proceedings are held in private so a mistake or dispute 
with a business partner will not be publicized. This helps 
preserve a long-ter.m relationship between the 
parties. [Ref. 61] 
2. D18&4YaDtage• 
Mini-trials should be employed only in those cases 
which involve factual disputes and are governed by well 
established principles of law. Cases which present original 
issues of law or where witness credibility is a major factor, 
are handled more effectively by traditional 
litigation. [Ref. 62] 
Cases which involve individuals against corporations 
are more appropriate for litigation in order to best serve the 
interests of the individual. And cases which involve more than 
two parties are also best handled by litigation since the 
logistical difficulties involved would usually not overcome 
the benefits of using a mini-trial. [Ref. 63] 
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P. PACT- PDIDDTG 
Fact-finding is the investigation of specified issues by 
a neutral third-party who is selected by the disputants and 
has subject matter expertise. Fact-finding may be adopted 
voluntarily or may be imposed by the courts. The Federal 
Government may participate in fact-finding which results in a 
final decision only if they can decline to accept the decision 
before it becomes final and binding. [Ref. 64] 
Fact-finding is useful in resolving complex scientific, 
technical, business or economic issues where the presentation 
of proof is extremely difficult, expensive or time 
consuming. [Ref. 651 
The parties' initial agreement on the issues defines the 
neutral's role in fact-finding, as well as the subsequent use 
of the findings and recommendations. Once this agreement is 
framed, the role of the parties' is limited and the fact-
finder proceeds independently. If fact-finding is used in 
connection with an ongoing settlement negotiation, it is 
recommended that the parties suspend negotiations on the 
issues requiring fact-finding until the fact-finder's report 
is received. However, the fact-finder may hold meetings with 
the parties to gather documents, statements and other types of 
necessary information. [Ref. 66] 
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The initial agreement of the parties' should include a 
deadline for receipt of the tact-finder's report. The report 
should be used to influence the parties' positions and will 
provide an catalyst to engage in further settlement 
negotiations. [Ref. 67] 
1. Advantage• 
An advantage of fact-finding is that the neutral 
third-party is usually an expert on the issues in question, 
thus providing knowledge and insight which otherwise would not 
be readily available to the parties. The neutral would be able 
to analyze complex and confusing data and could provide the 
parties a summary of the findings; subsequently, the parties 
would be able to utilize their resources in other more 
productive ways. 
Another advantage of fact-finding is that the parties 
design and control the process; they decide on the neutral 
third-party and the rules and procedures to be followed. If 
the fact-finding is voluntary (not court imposed) the parties 
can agree on the finding as a whole, partially or can decide 
to discard the finding totally. [Ref. 68] 
2. Disadvantages 
Fact-finding is only suitable for disputes of a 
factual nature. Usually a fact- finder's decision will not 
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result in a compromise between the parties' positions, but 
will result in a winner take all solution. [Ref. 69] 
If the outcome of the fact-finding is non-binding on 
the parties, it may be admissible as evidence if the dispute 
goes to trial [Ref. 70]. Therefore, the parties may 
lose some confidentiality of the information they submitted 
during the fact-finding process. 
G. SUJIIIAitY 
No one alternative dispute method is best for resolving 
all disputes. The nature of the dispute and the disputants' 
objectives will deter.mine how they wish to resolve the issue. 
Among the factors that might determine the alternative dispute 
resolution method that will result in the most feasible 
solution are the nature of the relationship between the 
disputants, their need or desire for control over the outcome 
or process, the urgency to resolve the dispute and the desire 
for privacy. [Ref. 71] 
Negotiation is the most common type of alternative dispute 
resolution. Negotiation is simply ccmmunication between people 
in an effort to reach an agreement. They are voluntary, 
informal and structured by the parties to at a mutually 
acceptable settlement in the most efficient manner. 
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Mediation is a more structured process in which a neutral 
third-party assists the parties reach an agreement. Mediation 
is most appropriate to use when the parties have reached, or 
anticipate reaching, a negotiation impasse. A mediator can 
effectively break down the barriers that have caused the 
negotiation impasse. 
Arbitration is a process in which a dispute is submitted 
to a neutral third-party to render a decision. The standards 
for decision are agreed on in advance by the parties, and can 
be either binding or non-binding. 
Mini-trials are a structured process is which the parties 
agree on a procedure for presenting their cases, in a highly 
abbreviated version of a trial, to senior officials from each 
side with the authority to settle the dispute. The exact 
procedures of the mini-trial are determined by the parties. 
Fact-finding involves the use of neutrals to make 
determinations concerning disputed facts. Fact-finding is 
particularly useful when the disputed facts are of a highly 
technical nature and would best be resolved by experts. 
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IV. DGOTIA'!'BD S~ CUB UALYSIS 
A. DrrRODUC'l'IOIT 
On 20 August 1992, the u.s. Navy and Lockheed Aeronautical 
Systems Company completed negotiations to settle a dispute 
concerning the termination of the P-7A Long Range Anti-
submarine Warfare Capability Aircraft program. The case 
analysis was conducted using documents consisting of 
unpublished, internal memoranda of the Navy and Lockheed. 
Interviews of the chief negotiators for the parties were 
conducted in order to support and elaborate on the information 
contained in the documents. 
B. BACEGROUBD 
On 7 October 1988, Lockheed was notified they had been 
competitively selected for award of a contract for Full Scale 
Engineering Development and production options of the P-7A. 
This aircraft was intended to replace the Na~~·s existing P-3 
aircraft. On S January 1989, contract N00019-89-C-0097 was 
awarded on a fixed price incentive basis in the amount of 
$600,247,704, with a ceiling of 12St ($7S0,309,629) and a 
share ratio of sot government/SOt contractor. 
4S 
In November 1989, Lockheed informed the Navy that they 
were experiencing weight and schedule problems. Further 
discussions indicated that Lockheed was projecting substantial 
losses on the P-7A program. Over a period of several months 
the Navy and Lockheed held discussions in order to reach an 
agreement concerning schedule, cost and technical 
difficulties. Despite their efforts, an agreement could not be 
made. 
On 30 March 1990, the Navy notified Lockheed that its 
failure to make progress endangered performance under the 
terms of the contract and stated that unless the conditions 
were cured within ten days, the Navy would, under the terms of 
the contract, terminate the contract due to default. On 6 
April 1990, Lockheed sent a detailed letter in response to the 
Navy's cure notice. Despite that response and subsequent 
discussions, the Navy terminated the contract for default on 
20 July 1990. On 30 July 1990 the Navy issued a demand notice 
to Lockheed for the $124,094,357 in unliquidated progress 
payments. 
On 30 August 1990, Lockheed filed a notice of appeal with 
the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals. This was 
followed, on 30 October 1990 by an initial complaint against 
the Navy's termination for default. Lockheed felt they should 
not have been terminated for default since: (1) they never 
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failed to prosecute work under the terms of the contract in 
face of the Navy's direction to perform; (2) the Navy had 
waived delivery and certain performance requirements; (3) the 
Navy's failure to approve/disapprove specific requirements 
constituted an excusable delay; (4) the inconsistent contract 
requirements constituted a mutual mistake. Lockheed requested 
the termination for default be converted to a termination for 
convenience and that relief be granted in the form of cost 
recovery plus interest. The Navy's response to the complaint, 
dated 15 March 1991, maintained the termination for default 
was proper. 
C. INITIAL HBGOTIATBD SBTTLBIOD1'1' 
The Navy immediately realized the benefits of using 
negotiations to resolve the P-7A issues. Ongoing litigation 
would be time consuming and expensive, and there would be no 
guarantee of obtaining a favorable decision. An unfavorable 
decision mean the default termination would be converted to 
convenience, resulting in Lockheed being compensated for 
incurred work. Whereas, a favorable decision would confirm the 
Navy's default decision, enabling them to recover up to $124.1 
million in unliquidated progress payments plus accrued 




In December 1991 the Navy Program Manager began 
discussions with Lockheed regarding the resolution of the 
outstanding P-7A issues. The discussions resulted in a 
tentative agreement in which the Navy would obtain all the P-
7A data, inclusive of P-3 data Lockheed used during the course 
of competing for the P-7A program, and unlimited rights to use 
such data for other than production of a new aircraft. 
Additionally, the pending litigation would be dismissed, and 
the Navy would be released from any current and future claims 
and appeals. The Navy would have to make no future payments. 
In consideration to Lockheed, the default would be converted 
to a no cost termination and Lockheed would retain the 
unliquidated progress payments of $124,094,357. 
This tentative agreement was conditionally approved by 
NAVAIR contracting officials in May 1992; but the conditions 
required that a legal entitlement memorandum be obtained from 
NAVAIR counsel. This condition could not be met. NAVAIR 
counsel's position was that the unliquidated progress payments 
could only be used for the program it was appropriated for. 
The funds could be used for items within the scope of the P-7A 
program, but not for P-3 data, even though that data was used 
in the development of the P-7A contract data. The P-3 data 
rights would have to be obtained through appropriate funding 
and that funding was not available at that time. It was the 
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Navy's position that the benefit from obtaining the P-3 data 
rights could not be overlooked. They would have to negotiate 
a settlement in which they could obtain the P-3 data rights. 
D. DGOTIATIOH PLU 
1. Process for Pact-finding 
On 5 June 1992, Lockheed and the Navy executed a "Plan 
for Proceeding with Negotiations Regarding P-7A Litigation". 
This plan consisted of six steps: 
1. Trial counsel agrees on the proposed plan of action as 
set forth in the plan. 
2. Counsel present the proposed plan to their respective 
principals with a recommendation for approval. 
3 . Upon agreement by the principals to proceed in accordance 
with the plan, the following actions must be 
accomplished: 
(a) Suspension of activities before the ASBCA for a stay 
period beginning 18 December 1991 which will continue 
in effect for 60 days after either party provides the 
other with written notice that the stay period is at 
end. 
(b) DCAA's audit of Lockheed's incurred cost of 
performance and the costs set forth in the claims. 
(c) Simultaneous exchange of specified documents by 5 
June 1992. 
(d) Confidentiality with respect to all communications 
related to the settlement process; neither party 
waives rights under the discovery process; 
contemplated papers, witness summaries and litigation 
assessments will be classified as the work product of 
Counsel and subject to protection and non-disclosure 
of any of the discussions pursuant of the plan. 
49 
4. Preparation and exchange of papers which provide 
comprehensive statements of the parties' positions on the 
issues of the case. 
5. Counsel to provide an assessment of litigative risk to 
their respective principals who, if they determine 
negotiations would be fruitful, will assign high level 
representatives to conduct such negotiations. 
6. Parties will either agree on a settlement or, if no 
agreement is reached, reinstate the proceedings which 
have been stayed. 
2. Blaboration of the Steps of the Jlegotiation Plan 
Steps 1, 2, 3a, 3c, 3d and 6 of the negotiation plan 
are self-explanatory, the remaining steps of the negotiation 
plan are summarized below. 
a. Step 3b 
Lockheed has asserted four claims against the Navy 
in which monetary factors were present. These claims included: 
1. Price adjustment claim - The purpose of this claim was to 
achieve an increase in ceiling price in order that 
Lockheed's recovery be increased if a determination is 
made to convert the termination from default to 
convenience. The basis of this claim was that the 
contract requirements were inconsistent and collectively 
not achievable and that the Navy interfered with 
Lockheed's perfo~ce. 
2. Reformation claim - Lockheed submitted a claim to reform 
the contract type from fixed price incentive to cost. 
This claim reflects the Lockheed position that the 
statutes and regulations required the use of a cost type 
contract for the research and development effort and that 
the assumption that the Navy's requirements were 
collectively achievable was a mutual mistake. 
3. Termination settlement proposal - This claim is premised 
on the result of Lockheed's appeal of the termination 
being converted from default to convenience. 
so 
4. The value of completed and partially completed R&D work -
In the event of a unfavorable decision of Lockheed's 
claim, under FAR 52.249-9, subparagraph (f), they would 
be entitled to recover the cost of completed and 
partially completed R&D work even if the te~ination for 
default is sustained. 
The purpose of the DCAA audit was to dete~ine the 
Government's potential liability if the Lockheed appeal was 
successful, if the contract type was changed and the 
termination was converted to convenience. The results of the 
DCAA audit were also used by the Navy in dete~ning their 
maximum liability. This amount was used in computing the 
litigative risk of the Navy as described in part 2c of this 
section. Lockheed used their own records of costs incurred to 
support their position. 
b. St:ep 4 
The legal position of Lockheed is based on six 
issues described in the Lockheed document "Initial Statement 
of Position" dated 3 July 1992. These issues were responded to 
by the Navy in its "Position Paper - P-7A Alternative Dispute 
Resolution" dated 30 October 1992. Lockheed submitted a 
rebuttal to the Navy's response in "Lockheed's Reply to the 
Navy's Position Paper- P-7A Alternative Dispute Resolution". 
These position papers covered the requirement of step 4 of the 
negotiation plan. The six issues of concern included: 
1. Whether the Navy's P-7A requirements were inconsistent 
and not collectively achievable. 
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2. Whether, as a consequence of out-of-scope Navy demands 
relative to approval of the Lockheed approach to 
establishing the guaranteed weight empty, the required 
fatigue analyses, vital to maintaining weight and 
schedule requirements, were delayed and disrupted. 
3. Whether the Navy rejected the terms on which the default 
termination is based and therefore, under its own 
statement of the contract, the Navy is precluded from 
termination for default. 
4. Whether the Navy waived its right to terminate the 
contract for default for Lockheed's failure to meet the 
Best and Final Offer (BAFO) schedule and weight. 
5. Whether or not the Navy can base a default termination on 
issues of contract interpretation in the absence of 
express Government direction, with which the contractor 
refuses to comply. 
6. Whether Lockheed is entitled to recover costs incurred 
even if the termination is sustained. 
The purpose of this step was to provide each party 
with an opportunity to evaluate each others position. The 
actual documentation consisted of numerous volumes of 
technical data used to support the positions of each party 
during the negotiations. By evaluating the documentation, each 
party had available information that could be used to 
ascertain their negotiation strengths, and subsequently 
formulate the parties' litigative risk. The actual 
negotiations did not attempt to resolve which party was at 
fault in each issue; but, was more concerned with the final 
outcome of the process. 
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c. Step 5 
The Navy generally acknowledged there was at least 
a 1St risk of losing even a very strong case; that even if a 
case appears to be flawless, due to the nature of litigation, 
there still existed a chance of losing the case. The Navy's 
counsel in the P-7A case felt that even though their position 
was strong overall, there existed some risk that Lockheed 
might prevail with respect to same of the issues in question. 
In view of this, the Navy counsel considered it reasonable to 
assign the P-7A case a litigative risk of up to 30t. Meaning 
that, based on the parties' legal positions, it would be in 
the best interests of the Navy to pay Lockheed between 1St and 
30t of its maximum potential liability now as part of the 
settlement and not risk having to pay the full amount the Navy 
would have to pay if it lost the case in litigation. 
In determdning their maximum liability, the Navy 
based its figures on the assumption that Lockheed would be 
successful in having the termination converted to convenience. 
It also assumed that they would be unsuccessful in adjusting 
the contract target and ceiling prices and would not establish 
an entitlement to costs in excess of the funds obligated and 
identified in the contract as the Government's maximum 
liability. However, the Navy counsel expressed that same 
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upward adjustment may be warranted to account for litigative 
risk that existed in these two areas. 
There was no documentation available on the actual 
litigative risk that Lockheed felt they faced. In questioning 
Mr. Ron Pinkbinder, Lockheed's lead negotiator in this case, 
he was not readily familiar with any actual figures that were 
derived as Lockheed's litigative risk. But he felt that 
Lockheed would have a strong position if the case went to 
litigation. 
Despite the fact that each party felt they would 
be successful if the case went to litigation, they both felt 
that their best interests would be served if they used 
negotiations to settle the dispute. It was initially discussed 
that the negotiators for the case would be the Secretary of 
the Navy, Lawrence Garrett and Lockheed's Chief Executive 
Officer, Joseph Tellup. But the negotiators had to be changed 
since Mr. Garrett was unavailable (he was resigning his 
position). The obvious second choice for the Navy was Grey 
Cammack, the Director of Procurement Policy for the Office of 
the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Developnent and 
Acquisition). In that it was important to keep the 
negotiations on a level playing field, Ron Pinkbinder, the 
Vice-president of Contracts was selected to negotiate the 
settlement for Lockheed. 
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B. ADVAftAQBS OJ' USDIG A lmGO!'D.Tm ~~~""'·....-r 
Both Parties believed a negotiated set:.tlement would be the 
best method to resolve the P-7A dispute. They knew that if the 
case went to litigation the process would take considerably 
longer to resolve; similar cases have taken up to 10 years to 
litigate. This would prove expensive to both the Navy and 
Lockheed. For example, Table 1 is the Navy's preliminary 
budget of the projected costs of litigation. Lockheed did not 
have any actual cost projections available; but, Mr. 
Finkbinder felt that negotiations would always provide less 
expensive solutions to disputes. Furthermore, Lockheed's 
lawyers were stressing the value of alternative dispute 
resolution as a tool to settle contract disputes. 
Both sides felt that if the dispute went to litigation, it 
would have a negative impact on personnel resources. The 
litigation would disrupt other programs that P-7A engineers 
and associated personnel would be working on. These personnel 
would have to put valuable time and effort into the 
litigation, this could be minimized if the dispute was 
resolved by the quickest means possible. Additionally, it 
would prove extremely difficult to keep all personnel who 
would be needed to testify on the P-7A case available. People 
would be transferring to other programs and jobs which 
required relocation. Their unique knowledge on the P-7A would 
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not be readily available during the entire litigation and 
obtaining this information would prove to be difficult and 
inefficient. 
It was important for the parties to control the dispute 
resolution process. The Navy felt that it was important to be 
able to obtain the P-3 data rights during the resolution. 
Lockheed was willing to relinquish the rights, on a limited 
Table I COSTS OF LITIGATION 
n9J 
"" 
n95 n• lUI'AL 
LITIIATICII 12,104,000 12,000,000 11,000,000 1700,000 15,804,000 
SlJIIICIIT 
ATnwEIS S200 000 1400 000 1400 000 1400 000 11 400 000 
IWtALRAI.S S82 500 1165,000 1165 000 1165._000 1577,500 
lAVAl I 1250,000 S500,000 1500,000 1500,000 11,750,000 
TWAWL 1300,000 1125,000 1100,000 160,000 1515,000 
IEJIIEIIPS 
SlJIIICIIT 145,000 190,000 190,000 190,000 1315,000 
IDITUCTIII 
,.... so 135,000 135,000 135,000 1105,000 
EIIPUJIEES 
BIIIPIEIIT 165,000 121,000 121,000 121,000 1149.000 
IIEPOIJTICIII so 1100,000 1140,000 so 1240.000 
-·· 
so so so 115,000 115,000 
TUIIICiliPT 
EJIIIDT so 1105,000 1210,000 1210,000 1525,000 
IIITIIESSES 
lUI'AL 13,046,500 13,548,000 12,661,000 12,203,000 111 465,500 
56 
basis. If the case had gone to litigation, the process would 
have been less flexible and the P-3 issue would not have been 
addressed. 
Both parties wanted to put the P-7A contract behind them. 
Lockheed felt that the contract was faulty from the beginning. 
They never felt comfortable with the Navy's requirements, that 
they were not collect! vely achievable. The Navy was anxious to 
settle the matter as well, and were willing to compensate 
Lockheed for same incurred costs in return for completed work 
and the P-3 data rights. The dispute was non-adversarial and 
a quick negotiated settlement would keep the environment for 
future contracts between the Navy and Lockheed positive. 
P. PllOPOSBD SBTTLBIIID1'1' S'l'llUC'l'OitB 
The Navy developed a structure to the settlement agreement 
prior to the negotiation. By doing so they were able to 
organize the negotiations around specified terms. This 
facilitated the process and enabled it to be completed in an 
efficient manner. The proposed structure of the settlement 
agreement was: 
1. Lockheed will be paid for its perfo~ce on the P-7A 
contract and for providing the Government with unlimited 
rights as outlined in paragraph 4. This amount will be 
determdned during the negotiations. 
2. Lockheed will return to the Government the difference 
between the negotiated amount it is due and the $124.1 
million in unliquidated progress payments. 
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3. The te~ination for default will be changed to a 
te~ination by mutual agreement of the parties. 
4. Lockheed will provide the Navy with: 
(a} All data, software, tooling and material generated, 
relied on or referred to by Lockheed during the 
course of competing for or developing the P-7A 
aircraft, including all P-3 aircraft documentation. 
(b) Unlimited rights to use all data provided under 
paragraph 4(a} for any purpose other than the 
procurement of new production aircraft. 
(c) Unrestricted rights to use all software provided 
under paragraph 4(a}. 
s. Lockheed will have all pending litigation dismissed and 
will release and waive all claims arising out of or in 
connection with the solicitation, award, perfor.mance and 
te~nation of the P-7A contract arising out of, or in 
connection with the procurement of any additional rights 
of data under paragraph 4(b). 
6. The Government will not be required to make any further 
payments, in connection with the P-7A program or the use 
for any purpose of any data or software provided to the 
Government as part of the settlement, except if a 
separate agreement is made in the event the Government 
seeks to use the data for purposes of procuring new 
production aircraft. 
7. Neither party will make any admissions or concessions 
regarding liability, nor will they make any disclosures 
regarding the settlement unless required to by law or by 
Congress. If requested by the Government, Lockheed will 
provide any witness or data needed to respond to any 
Congressional inquiry or hearing. 
At this point the parties were ready to begin 
negotiations. The Secretary of the Navy was informed of the 
plan to initiate negotiations within two weeks. The purpose of 
this was to advise the Secretary of the Navy of the general 
nature of the dispute, the issues that existed, and that the 
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Navy had formulated a negotiation plan. The Secretary of the 
Navy was informed that negotiations were expected to begin 
within two weeks. There was no requirement for the Secretary 
of the Navy to approve the negotiations, but it was indicated 
that he would be advised prior to entering a final settlement. 
G. DGOTIA'l'IORS 
The Navy and Lockheed met at the offices of the Assistant 
Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development and Acquisition) 
on five different occasions during the period of 15 June 1993 
to 20 August 1993. The negotiators, Mr. Finkbinder of Lockheed 
and Mr. Cammack of the Navy, were unassisted during the 
negotiations except for Mr. Sidney Tronic of the Navy. Mr. 
Ma.rafino, Lockheed's Vice-Chairman of the Board and Chief 
Financial Officer, attended the last negotiation session on 20 
August 1993. No legal or other personnel took part in the 
actual negotiations. After each negotiation session, however 
both of the negotiators advised and consulted concerned 
personnel on the status of the negotiation. 
1. 15 J1D1B 1993 
During the negotiation session of 15 June ~~93, Mr. 
Cammack introduced the proposed settlement structure outlined 
in Section F of this chapter. Mr. Finkbinder was familiar with 
the structure as it was similar to the structure of the 
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initial settlement agreement of December 1991, as discussed in 
Section C of this chapter. Mr. Pinkbinder indicated that 
concerning data rights, Lockheed might prefer changing the 
"unlimited rights • to •Government purpose license rights • and 
may want to expand th~ limitations to include foreign military 
sales. 
Mr. caumack stated that the Navy's settlement position 
was based on five elements: 
1. The value of residual inventory. 
2. The value associated with obtaining increased data rights 
of P-3 data. 
3. Litigation costs that would be avoided. 
4. Litigative risk. 
5. Intangibles. 
Mr. Cammack proposed that $48 million was the value of 
those elements and that if Lockheed agread, they would have to 
return the difference between that amount and the $124 .1 
million in unliquidated progress payments plus interest. Mr. 
Pinkbinder indicated that Lockheed had a substantially higher 
figure in mind, but did not propose any counteroffer at that 
time. 
Mr. Pinkbinder questioned the need of the Navy to 
classify and fund the P-3 data rights as a new procurement. 
Mr. Cammack assured him that the Navy looked into the matter 
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extensively, but agreed to have Navy counsel discuss the issue 
with Lockheed counsel. 
As a follow- up to the meeting, Lockheed agreed to 
consider the Navy's proposal of $48 million and would work on 
any changes they wanted to make to the wording of the terms 
and conditions of the settlement. 
2. 28 JtJRB 1993 
During the negotiation session of 28 June 1993, Mr. 
Cammack and Mr. Finkbinder discussed the Navy's previous offer 
of $48 million. Lockheed stressed that they still wanted to 
settle the matter. However, they felt that $48 million was an 
extremely low figure. In response to such a low amount, 
Lockheed countered with an extremely high offer of $240 
million. The Navy would have to pay the difference between 
this amount and the $124.1 million in unliquidated progress 
payments plus interest. The $240 million figure represented 
the amount Lockheed would be entitled to if they were 
successful in converting the termination for default to 
convenience. 
Mr. Cammack responded that there was not enough 
litigative risk in the Navy's position to justify such a high 
settlement. At that time he felt the gap was too large in 
order for a settlement to be reached. Mr. Cammack even 
suggested that it might make sense to activate the 60 day 
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notice period for instituting the litigation process. Mr. 
Finkbinder opposed this suggestion and stated that Lockheed 
felt strongly about its position if the matter went to 
litigation, but $240 million was not Lockheed's final offer. 
He requested that the Navy reexamine their position and come 
back with an offer on the high side of their negotiation 
range. 
Mr. Finkbinder also addressed the terms and conditions 
the Navy presented during the previous negotiation session. 
The most significant change they requested was that the Navy 
would only get whatever rights for technical data they would 
have received under the terms of the P-7A contract and not the 
unlimited rights they proposed. Mr. Cammack stressed the 
Navy's interest in resolving the issue of the P-3 data rights 
during this process and if that could not be accomplished, 
they would seek other methods to resolve the entire issue. Mr. 
Finkbinder agreed to discuss the Navy's concerns with Lockheed 
officials. 
3. 16 JULY 1993 
The P-3 data rights again where a main issue during 
the 16 July 1993 negotiation session. The Navy believed there 
were serious questions concerning the validity of Lockheed's 
claim that certain P-3 program technical data was proprietary. 
This had been a major contention, but the Navy was taking the 
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position that any P-7A settlement must give the Government a 
right to use any P-3 data for any Government purpose. Lockheed 
continued to dispute the Government's position, but understood 
the necessity of resolving the issue. 
The parties discussed the proposed terms and 
conditions for the settlement. The dispute over the P-3 data 
had to be resolved before the rest of the terms cculd be 
addressed. Lockheed also desired to get a full release from 
the Government concerning the P-7A. Mr. Cammack noted that the 
Navy was limited in what it could do (for example, the Navy 
could not release Lockheed from claims by the Internal Revenue 
Service) . He was confident that the parties could draft a 
release provision that would prove satisfactory to Lockheed. 
The Navy had reevaluated its monetary position based 
on the latest DCAA audit position. They were now willing to 
pay $82 million in order to settle the issue. Mr. Finkbinder 
responded positively to this offer. He was disappointed 
however, when Mr. Cammack indicated this was in the general 
range of the Navy's final position. Mr. Finkbinder stated he 
would address the offer with Lockheed management. 
4. 28 JULY 1993 
Mr. Finkbinder indicated that Lockheed officials were 
pleased with the positive developments of the previous 
negotiation session and were eager to complete the 
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negotiations as quickly as possible. They still had areas of 
concern. Lockheed still resisted giving up total rights to the 
P-3 technical data. They were willing to allow the Government 
to use the data for internal purposes, but were reluctant to 
provide proprietary P-3 data to other contractors. 
Lockheed still felt that they had a high probability 
of winning the litigation and were not prepared to 
substantially drop their monetary position. Based on the 
latest DCAA audit figures, Lockheed contended that the Navy 
should pay them $171 million. Mr. Cammack indicated that 
Lockheed was very conservative in estimating the litigation 
cost avoidance. Mr. Finkbinder acknowledged that Lockheed's 
estimate may be inflated, but he was optimistic that the 
parties could reach an agreement. Mr. Cammack was not nearly 
as optimistic and reiterated that the Navy's offer of $82 
million during the previous negotiation session was close to 
its maximum position Mr. Cammack stated that it might be time 
to begin the 60 day stay period leading to the resumption of 
litigation. Mr. Finkbinder requested that Mr. Cammack discuss 
the situation with Navy officials. 
S. 20 AUGUST 1993 
On 6 August 1993, the Navy counsel had notified 
Lockheed by official correspondence, that they were initiating 
the 60 day stay period pursuant to step 3 .A.4 of the "Plan for 
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Proceeding with Negotiations Regarding P-7A Litigation•. This 
notification had intensified the urgency of the situation. 
Even though the Navy initiated the stay period, both parties 
still believed that settling the issues by negotiations would 
be in their mutual best interests. After some discussion, the 
parties agreed on the issue of the P-3 data, and that 
technical experts would be required to draft the appropriate 
language. Additionally, Lockheed agreed to the Navy's final 
proposal of the terms and conditions of the settlement. These 
also would be drafted at a latter time. 
The only remaining issue was that of monetary 
compensation. Lockheed offered to settle for $119 million and 
the Navy proposed a settlement of $100 million, which 
translated into an offer of $94 million in costs and $6 
million in interest. The parties remained $25 million apart, 
and the negotiation session ended that way. 
After a two hour break, the negotiations resumed via 
telephone. During the break Mr. Cammack had met with the P-3 
Program Manager and the P-7A litigation counsel in order to 
consider their position. The litigation counsel recalculated 
the Navy's monetary position and indicated they could support 
a settlement of up to $119 million. The P-3 Program Manager 
voiced concern over the wording of the P-3 data rights 
agreement. He felt the agreement would prohibit the Navy from 
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using the data rights during the Service Life Extension 
Program of the existing P- 3 aircraft. The requirement to have 
the P-3 data rights for this program was vital. 
During the telephone negotiations the remaining issues 
were resolved. Lockheed agreed to word the P-3 data rights so 
the Navy could use them for the Service Life Extension 
Program. They were just concerned that the rights could not be 
used for new production aircraft. After a series of offers and 
counteroffers, Mr. Finkbinder and Mr. caDinack reached an 
agreement of $111 million as monetary compensation to 
Lockheed. 
B. TBB P·7A SB'l'TLBIIID1'1' AQRRIMD1'1' 
When Mr. Finkbinder and Mr. Cammack came to the agreement 
on 20 August 1993, they were confident the agreed terms and 
conditions they proposed would stand. Even though they had to 
notify their respective officials of the settlement, they felt 
that, because of the authority they possessed, the way they 
justified their positions and by the previous discussions they 
held with the officials, that their agreement would stand. 
The agreement was exec1.1ted by two mechanisms, a 
modification to the P-7AContract N00019-89-C-0097 and a fixed 
price contract under Basic Order Agreement N00019-92-G-0089 
order 0007 for the P-3 data rights. The terms and conditions 
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to the contract modit~ cation included the following 
provisions: 
1. The Ilavy's termination for default be converted to 
termination of the contract by mutual agreement. 
2. Lockheed will pay the Navy $13,094,357. This amount is 
the difference between the unliquidated progress payment 
amount of $124,097,357 and the settled amount of $111 
million. The $111 million total consists of Lockheed 
retaining $107 million of the unliquidated progress 
payment as compensation for its work on the P-7A program 
and Lockheed receiving $4 million for the P-3 data rights 
(as addressed in the Basic Order Agreement) . All amounts 
are inclusive of interest. 
3. Within six months Lockheed must deliver all P-7A data 
currently in their possession and all P-7A data they 
obtain in the future. All existing documents were being 
held within 2408 boxes in Rye Canyon, California; the 
contents of the boxes were to be indexed. The Government 
will have unlimited rights to the data without 
restrictions. 
4. Within three months Lockheed must deliver to the 
contracting officer a list of all materials, residual 
inventory, test equipment and tooling it has for the P-7A 
program. This material must be delivered to a Navy 
designated site without cost to the Government. 
5. Lockheed releases the Navy and the Navy releases Lockheed 
from all claims, demands and causes of action, in the 
present and in the future, relating to the P-7A contract. 
This is binding on the Navy only and not on the entire 
United States Governme!lt 
The terms and conditions for the P-3 data rights Basic 
Order Agreement allowed the Government to use those rights 
except under the following conditions: 
1. The manufacture of a new or derivative P-3 aircraft. 
2. An aircraft modification. alteration, redesign or 
remanufacture which replaces, or significantly alters 70t 
or more than the weight of an existing aircraft's frame. 
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3. For any non-United States Government owned and operated 
aircraft, including but not limited to foreign military 
sales contracts. 
I. DALYSIS OP Tllll P-7& 8~ 
The terms of the settlement were to the mutual 
satisfaction of both parties. Even though it was not 
determined who was at fault, the terms agreed on were what 
both parties wanted the process to achieve. It was 
predetermined that the program would not continue, so an 
answer to the various technical problems did not have to be so 
determined. The main goals of the settlement was to close the 
program, to determine who would retain the data rights and the 
residual inventory, and to determine the value of those items. 
Also, the negotiations provided a forum where the future 
disposition of the P-3 technical data rights could be 
addressed. 
Lockheed had no legitimate claim to the residual inventory 
and the technical data rights developed pursuant the P-7A 
program. Lockheed was under contract by the Navy to develop 
the technical data and build the P-7A aircraft, anything 
developed under the terms of the contract would become Navy 
property. The question existed on how much compensation 
Lockheed was entitled to in return for the work they 
performed. Through the negotiation process, based on the value 
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of what the Navy received and not on the total costs Lockheed 
incurred, the parties determined that an acceptable 
compensation would be $107 million for the work performed on 
the P-7A and $4 million for the P-3 technical data rights. 
It was important to settle the question of the P-3 
technical data rights. The flexible nature of the negotiations 
provided a ideal setting to do so. The results of the 
technical data rights issue determined during the negotiations 
was in the best interests of both parties. The Navy could use 
the data on an unlimited basis for the repair and modification 
of the existing P- 3 aircraft. Since the Navy now had no 
immediate plans to replace the P-3 aircraft, it was important 
for the Navy to obtain the rights so they could develop an 
effective Service Life Extension Program for the P- 3 aircraft. 
Lockheed was also satisfied with the settlement of the P-3 
technical data rights issue. If the Navy decided to replace 
the P-3 aircraft, Lockheed's data rights were protected. They 
would therefore, have a distinct advantage in receiving any 
future production contract. 
The negotiated settlement provided the best solution 
to the dispute over the P-7A program termination. The 
resources expended by the parties were minimal and 
substantially less than the potential costs that would have 
been expended to settle the case using litigation. The 
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solution provided by litigation would have been inferior to 
the actual solution in this case. It would not have met the 
needs of either Lockheed or the Navy. 
J. SU8UY 
Both Lockheed and the Navy were satisfied with the 
negotiation process and results. They realized the advantages 
that the process provided and were determined to negotiate a 
settlement. The only time the negotiations were in doubt was 
when the Navy initiated the 60 day stay period leading to 
litigation. This served to grab Lockheed's attention and 
compelled them to lower their monetary position. 
If the case went to litigation, the party that received 
the favorable decision would receive a better financial award 
than the amount they compromised on. Even though both parties 
felt that had a strong position, they were not willing to take 
the risks and bear the costs involved with litigation. 
Subsequently, the parties were willing to compromise their 
positions and develop a settlement agreement that was amicable 
to both Lockheed and the Navy. 
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A. SUMKARY 
The Federal Government fully supports the use of 
alternative dispute resolution to settle contract disputes 
with their contractors. Recent legislation requires that all 
contracting agencies develop an alternative dispute resolution 
program to increase the knowledge and usage of alternative 
dispute resolution within the Federal Government. 
There are numerous alternative dispute resolution methods 
available to contracting personnel. Familiarization with the 
characteristics, advantages and disadvantages of the different 
methods will help them ascertain which method would best 
settle each specific dispute. 
The negotiated settlement of the P-7A dispute between 
Lockheed Corporation and the Navy is an excellent example of 
a successful alternative dispute resolution process. The 
dispute was settled in the most efficient and effective manner 
to the mutual satisfaction of both parties. Lockheed and the 
Navy realized the positive aspects of using alternative 
dispute resolution to settle the P-7A dispute. 
Negotiation was the best alternative dispute resolution 
method available to settle the dispute. Other methods would 
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have required assistance from a neutral third-party, this was 
not necessary due to the characteristics of this particular 
case. The dispute was non-adversarial and they parties had 
similar desired outcomes of the settlement. A mediator was not 
needed to smooth over the negotiations or to set goals for the 
parties. The parties did not have to determine fault during 
the settlement process, therefore it was unnecessary to have 
an arbitrator determine which party was at fault. A fact-
finder would have been useful if the technical issues had to 
be resolved in order for the program to continue. Since this 
was not the case, fact-finding would not have been helpful. A 
mini-trial could have been used to settle the dispute, however 
there were no advantages that mini-trials would have had over 
the negotiated settlement process that Lockheed and the Navy 
decided to use. 
Litigation would have provided a solution to the dispute, 
but the costs of litigation would have outweighed the 
benefits. The only way the dispute would have gone to 
litigation was if the parties could not negotiate a fair and 
reasonable settlement. It was pre-determined that litigation 
would have been the next step in the dispute process, and that 
no other alternative dispute resolution method would have been 
considered. The parties felt they had the means available to 
determine a solution to the dispute. If they could not reach 
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an agreement, they would not solicit a neutral third-party to 
help them do so. 
Currently, both Lockheed and the Navy follow policies that 
promote the use of alternative dispute resolution to settle 
contract disputes. The Navy follows the requirements of the 
Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1990 which promotes 
the use of alternative dispute resolution and Lockheed 
management stresses to contracting personnel that they should 
always try to resolve disputes by the easiest means available, 
they identified negotiations as that method. 
B. COHCLUSIOHS OK USBU.CB QUBSTIOHS 
1. Pr:llllary Research Question 
Why was a negotiated settlement used to solve the P-7A 
program dispute and what were the characteristics and 
results of the process? 
Both Lockheed and the Navy immediately realized that 
using a negotiated settlement to solve the dispute of the 
ter.mination of the P-7A program would be the most efficient 
and effective process. The nature of the issues of the dispute 
and the goals the parties wanted the process to achieve, led 
to using a negotiated settlement. The issues were mainly of a 
technical nature; however, they didn't have to be resolved in 
order for the P-7A program to continue. It was already 
deter.mined that the program would not be continued, the only 
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action left was to determine the terms of the settlement. This 
led the parties to use the easiest method to resolve the 
dispute. Despite the monetary effect a favorable decision in 
litigation would have provided; neither party was willing to 
risk their position and disregard the advantages of using a 
negotiated settlement provided in favor of going to 
litigation. 
It was not essential to determine which party was at 
fault in order to resolve the dispute. They both wanted a 
resolution as quickly as possible in order to put the program 
behind them so they could concentrate their resources in other 
areas. The Navy also wanted to resolve the issue of the P-3 
data rights and was able to do so using a negoti.<l ted 
settlement. 
The negotiated settlement process did prove efficient 
and effective. It was completed during a four month period 
consisting of five negotiation sessions. The process required 
limited, but concentrated personnel and support resources. The 
negotiations concentrated on the underlying goals of the 
dispute resolution and not on determining which party was at 
fault. The results of the process were completed to the mutual 
satisfaction of both parties. The Navy received all completed 
work on the P-7A program and also acquired the P- 3 data 
rights. Lockheed received a fair price for their work and the 
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data rights. Either party could have received a more favorable 
monetary decision from litigation, but after exploring their 
options they realized a negotiated settlement best served 
their interests. 
2. Subsidiary Research Questions 
a. What did both parties perceive to be the positive and 
negative aspects of using an alternative dispute 
resolution? 
Both Lockheed and the Navy benefitted from the 
advantages that negotiations presented. The process was 
substantially faster then what litigation would have been. The 
process took four months to complete, which was considerably 
faster than had the case gone to litigation. This resulted in 
substantial savings in costs and resources. 
There were times when the parties seemed to be far 
apart in their positions, but the non-adversarial and positive 
nature of the negotiations enabled the parties come to a 
relatively quick decision that was mutually satisfactory to 
both parties. The process was also flexible, with the parties 
remaining in control. The parties were able to develop and 
follow an agenda that would best satisfy the goals they 
desired to achieve through the settlement. 
The process was accomplished privately. Going to 
litigation could have resulted in increased press coverage of 
the dispute. This subsequently might have pressured the Navy 
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into taking a stronger, less flexible and more adversarial 
approach in order to protect the best interests of the 
taxpayers. Lockheed would have done the same to protect their 
stockholders. 
There were no major disadvantages of using 
negotiations to settle the dispute. The only indication of a 
negative aspect of the process was that Lockheed felt they 
were hindered by the discovery process. The process was in the 
Navy's favor since they were privy to all Lockheed's documents 
prior to the negotiations. If the dispute would have gone to 
litigation this would not have been the case. 
b. Given the positive and negative aspects of the 
alternative dispute resolution, will alternative 
dispute resolution methods be the preferred option to 
resolve future contract disputes? 
Lockheed does favor the use of alternative dispute 
resolution over litigation. They have no pre-determined 
criteria for which cases should be resolved using alternative 
dispute resolution, but they stress to contracting personnel 
that disputes should be settled using alternative dispute 
resolution whenever possible. Litigation should be used only 
as a last resort. The type of alternative dispute resolution 
that Lockheed usually uses is negotiations. They have not used 
many other types, but would consider using them in the future 
if the situation warrants. 
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The Navy hopes to increase the use of alternative 
dispute resolution in the future. As Federal agencies 
implement their alternative dispute resolution programs, as 
required by the Administrative Dispute Act of 1990, they 
should become more familiar with and increase their use of 
alternative dispute resolution. 
c. What is the Federal Government's current policy 
concerning the use of alternative dispute resolution 
to settle contract disputes with their contractors? 
The current policy of the Federal Government is to use 
alternative dispute resolution instead of litigation whenever 
possible. Alternative dispute resolution have always been 
available for contracting officers to use for settling 
contract disputes. Contracting officers, however, have been 
reluctant to use them due to their unfamiliarity with the 
different processes. To increase the use of alternative 
dispute resolution by Government contracting officers, 
Congress passed the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 
1990. This Act reiterates the preference of using alternative 
dispute resolution whenever possible and directs Federal 
agencies to develop a program for alternative dispute 
resolution and to provide training for that program. 
d. What are the common types of alternative dispute 
resolution available to the Federal Government for 
solving contract disputes? 
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There are a myriad of different types of alternative 
dispute resolution available to the Federal Government. The 
most common types are negotiation, mediation, arbitration, 
mini-trial and fact-finding. Bach of these methods has its own 
distinct characteristics, advantages and disadvantages. Before 
selecting a particular type of alternative dispute resolution, 
a contracting officer must become familiar with the different 
methods in order to determine which would provide the most 
efficient and effective means to settle the issues of the 
dispute. 
C. RBCOIIIIBRDA'l'IONS 
The following are recommendations dealing with the use of 
alternative dispute resolution: 
1. The Federal Government should continue to use alternative 
dispute resolution whenever feasible to settle contract 
disputes. 
2. The Navy should develop a model alternative dispute 
resolution program, based on the requirements of the 
Administrative Disputes Act of 1990, for use by their 
various contracting agencies. 
3. The Navy should provide ample funding for alternative 
dispute resolution training, as the benefits of the 
training will outweigh the costs. 
4. The promotion of alternative dispute resolution should 
come from the highest levels of the agency. Alternative 
dispute resolution programs will only be effective if 
they are supported from the top and contracting personnel 
are encouraged to follow the programs. 
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5. The Navy should provide incentives for using alternative 
dispute resolution. Agencies should be recognized and 
rewarded for using alternative dispute resolution. 
D. ARBAS POll POB.'l'IIBJl RBSBU.CB 
The following are areas for future research dealing with 
alternative dispute resolution: 
1. A similar case study of a different type of alternative 
dispute resolution. It would be most effective and 
interesting if the dispute was in its early stages and 
the researcher could assist in the process. Limitations 
on time and money would exist, but it would prove 
valuable if the researcher could analyze any part of the 
process as it takes place. 
2. Develop a model alternative dispute resolution program 
for the Navy based on the requirements of the 
Administrative Disputes Act of 1990. 
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